PARANOIA AMONG THE PROFS

GUEST POST: A RESPONSE TO HYSTERIA AROUND THE IHRA DEFINITION OF ANTISEMITISM.

A friend wrote the following response to a commentary about alleged “silencing” caused by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism. For professional reasons, they cannot publish this under their own name. I am honored to share it and endorse every word -- even though I did not write it.

As you read it, I would ask you to remember that the two authors of the original article seem to have no concerns about professional repercussions around publishing it. My friend, who penned this response, does not have the same confidence.

I have something to say about this subject myself. Boy do I ever. Stay tuned for my future post about crybullies and victim-envy.

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Natasha Tuskiov and Blayne Haggart’s article urging faculty to push back against the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism published by the Centre for Free Expression (December 9, 2024) is a remarkable statement.

They imagine IHRA is part of a massive international campaign that “seeks domination over and silencing of Palestinians and their supporters.” This would be an astonishing achievement for a definition that is not legally binding and has no penalties required or even suggested. If it were, it would then have dire impact in Israel because, they assert, it would “strategically shut down criticism of Israel’s conduct in its war on Hamas and Gaza.” Anyone who listens to the Knesset debate, watches the events in Hostage Square in Tel Aviv, or who follows any Israeli politician in the press or social media would know criticism of the government is everywhere.

Tuskiov and Haggart note that one expert involved in writing the IHRA definition has questioned if it is useful on university campuses. However, the definition was the product of years of work from an international group of experts from many fields. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance has produced not only that one definition but many valuable resources on antisemitism for use in many different contexts. The reservations of one man are interesting but should not be taken as a definitive.

Most importantly, the definition is a working definition. It is not the cudgel of their overheated imagination. It is a guide, a way to ask questions, and a set of principles. It is not rigid nor is it closed. It does not, as they fear, require the silencing of opponents or the domination over anyone. The definition says “would,” “could,” or “may” in every example because it is asks questions and points to historic examples that may be illustrative. Since it is not legally binding, it would always be read in light of other principles including hate speech laws, academic freedom, and human rights legislation.

Perhaps this professor who researches crime and technology and another who is expert in intellectual property have scant understanding of antisemitism. This is particularly instructive, since the very imagery they employ, of controlling, manipulative, powerful Jews controlling what others say and think seems to owe a great deal to the foundational document of modern antisemitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

Their greatest concern seems to be the so-called “weaponizing of antisemitism,” instead of antisemitism itself. The IHRA definition helps us understand antisemitism. It does not instruct a university what to do but it does guide us on how to understand it. It’s a first step and we need much more to effectively address the antisemitism that is in Canada. This definition will not resolve a war in another country but it might help us have a better way of understanding and dismantling antisemitism.

It is incumbent upon those who question the value of the IHRA definition to propose an alternative way to combat antisemitism. Or perhaps the explosion of antisemitic rhetoric and actions in Canada – the firebombings of synagogues and shootings at schools, as well as a million lesser incidents of targeting – doesn’t concern them much at all?

The exceptional reaction to antisemitism, in contrast with every other form of racism and discrimination, is notable. In other cases, we listen to the victims and intended targets. We accept their definitions. We do not quibble, deny or dismiss.

When it comes to antisemitism, people who – in the case of every other form of discrimination accept that unrestrained free speech can have negative consequences – become victimized Voltaires for whom no moral, let alone legal, restraint on hateful rhetoric is justifiable.

This alone is evidence of something worth considering.